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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this note is to examine whether a tax fore-
closure sale should act to extinguish pre-existing servitudes
such as easements and real covenants.1 A majority of jurisdic-
tions have held that easements and restrictive covenants 2 are
not extinguished by a tax foreclosure sale.' In addition, a
number of states have gone so far as to enact statutes to deal
specifically with this issue.4 However, there are a minority of
jurisdictions that have taken the opposite approach and have
considered a tax title to be a new and perfect title that extin-
guished all pre-existing liens and encumbrances of any kind,
including easements and real covenants.5
1. For purposes of this note two forms of servitudes will be discussed: easements
and real covenants. An easement is an interest that entitles the owner of that interest
to the limited use and enjoyment of land possessed by another. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 450 (1944). Easements are divided into two categories: easements
appurtenant and easements in gross. An easement appurtenant is an easement that is
created to benefit the owner of the easement as possessor of a particular tract of land.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 453 (1944). An easement in gross is an easement that is
not created to benefit any specific parcel of land. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 454
(1944).
A real covenant is an agreement or promise between two or more parties that
something is done, will be done or will not be done regarding real property. 5 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 670 § [2] (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1986). Covenants
are divided into two types: affirmative and negative (restrictive). Id. Affirmative
covenants require the covenantor to perform some act. Id. An example of an
affirmative covenant would be a requirement that a property owner in a residential
community pay dues to a homeowner's association. Negative covenants require the
covenantor to refrain from doing some act. Id. An example of a negative covenant
would be a promise restricting a land owner from using his land for commercial
purposes. See 6 ROHAN, HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENTS--LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02(2) (1986).
2. Available case law that addresses the issue of real covenants and tax
foreclosure sales involves restrictive covenants. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 567
Caveat, (1944) (refusing to take a position as to the effect of a tax deed in
extinguishing an interest in land arising out of a promise to perform an act).
3. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
5. These jurisdictions are Iowa, Mississippi, Washington, Florida, Kansas, and
Massachusetts. At present, most of these states have altered their positions to some
degree by statute. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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Prior to the decision in Olympia v. Palzer,6 Washington's
approach was divided between the majority and minority posi-
tions. Washington's pre-1959 decisions followed the minority
position and allowed complete extinguishment of both ease-
ments and restrictive covenants upon a tax foreclosure sale.7
In 1959, the approach toward easements changed when the
Washington legislature enacted a statute establishing that tax
deeds are taken subject to any prior existing appurtenant ease-
ment.8 This statute aligned Washington with the majority of
jurisdictions as to easements, but the statute failed to specifi-
cally address the situation regarding real covenants.9 Palzer is
the first case since 1938 to address both tax sales and real
covenants.10
This Note analyzes the historical position taken by Wash-
ington courts regarding servitudes and tax sales prior to and
subsequent to the 1959 statute dealing with easements.1' The
Note next examines the Palzer holding,12 the degree to which
it aligns Washington's position with that of the majority,13 and
its limited support for future litigation involving other forms
of servitudes.' 4
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Pre-1959 Statutory Approach
Prior to 1959, the Washington Supreme Court had taken a
rigid position regarding the effect of tax foreclosure sales on
easements and real covenants.15 The court's position was based
6. 107 Wash. 2d 225, 728 P.2d 135 (1986).
7. See infra note 15.
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.64.460 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 66-76.
9. Id.
10. The only other Washington case to address the effect of a tax foreclosure sale
on real covenants is Messett v. Cowell, 194 Wash. 646, 79 P.2d 337 (1939). In Messett,
property that was burdened by a covenant restricting the use of lime located on the
property was sold for delinquent taxes. Id. at 648, 79 P.2d at 339. The court held the
restrictive covenant to be extinguished by the tax sale. Id. at 658, 79 P.2d at 342. The
Messett opinion contains no analysis as to why the covenant should be extinguished.
The court simply states that the land is free from the restriction. Id. The holding is
consistent with holdings of the same period regarding easements. See infra note 15.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 15-76.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 77-99.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 100-109.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 110-116.
15. Brown v. Olmsted, 49 Wash. 2d 210, 214, 299 P.2d 564, 567 (1956) (a tax
foreclosure sale creates a new title that extinguishes any rights of way, public or
private); Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 94 P.2d 749, 754 (1939) (where an
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on a very strict reading of the taxation statutes and a desire to
promote the priority of tax liens.16 No consideration was given
to possible benefits derived from such servitudes or the burden
that would be placed on the parties owning the beneficial
interest in the servitudes. 7
The first example of the court's doctrine was the 1911 deci-
sion of Hanson v. Carr.8 In Hanson, the court held that an
easement to use a strip of land as a private road was extin-
guished by a subsequent tax foreclosure sale.19 The court
interpreted the tax statutes to provide that all taxes imposed
on real estate shall create a lien that has priority over any
mortgage, judgment, debt, obligation or responsibility to or
with which the real estate may become charged.2" This prior-
ity rationale became the foundation for the subsequent cases
addressing the issue of tax foreclosure sales and servitudes
regardless of whether the servitude was an easement or a
covenant.21
The court reasoned that when a tax lien is foreclosed, the
fee passes to the purchaser and all grants made by the owner
easement by implication is extinguished by a tax foreclosure sale); Messett, 194 Wash.
at 658, 79 P.2d at 342 (see supra note 10); Tamplin v. Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 140, 168 P.
982, 985 (1917) (a tax foreclosure sale creates a new and paramount title that
completely divests any claimed private right of easement); Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash.
81, 118 P. 927 (1911) (see infra text accompanying notes 18-20). In addition, the
following cases from other jurisdictions support the Washington approach: City of
Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss. 818, 199 So. 91 (1940); Nedderman v. City of Des Moines,
211 Iowa 1352, 268 N.W. 36 (1936).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra note 20 and accompanying
text.
17. Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 11, 94 P.2d at 754 (the burden the court considered
significant was the burden placed upon tax assessors if the assessors were required to
consider the existence of easements in the valuation process).
18. 66 Wash. 81, 118 P. 927 (1911).
19. Id. at 83, 118 P. at 928.
20. Id.; see also Harmon, 1 Wash. at 10, 94 P.2d at 753. The present Washington
statute regarding tax lien priority is remarkably similar to the earlier versions
referenced in both Hanson and Harmon; § 84.60.010 provides:
All taxes and levies which may hereafter be lawfully imposed or assessed
shall be and they are hereby declared to be a lien respectively upon the real
and personal property upon which they may hereafter be imposed or assessed,
which liens shall include all charges and expenses of and concerning the said
taxes which, by the provisions of this title, are directed to be made. The said
lien shall have priority to and shall be fully paid and satisfied before any
recognizance, mortgage, judgment, debt, obligation or responsibility to or with
which said real and personal property may become charged or liable.
WASH. REV. CODE § 84.60.010 (1987) (emphasis added).
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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of the fee must be extinguished.22 The new tax title stems
from a source independent of the original owner, which conse-
quently would destroy all prior property interests. 23  The
source of the new tax title was considered to be a new grant
from the sovereign state.24 The only way to protect a servitude
from possible extinction would be to segregate 21 the servitude
for tax purposes from the servient estate and then pay the tax
on the servitude separately.26 The court reasoned that a sub-
stantial burden would be placed on the taxing authority if the
authority were required to examine each tract of land for pos-
sible easements.27
The tax lien priority rationale was a harsh doctrine and
resulted in a per se rule of tax deed superiority. The problem
with the tax lien priority approach was that the general policy
supporting the analysis only addressed one side of the issue:
the collection of taxes.2 8 Very little consideration was given to
the value of the interests being extinguished.29
Today's modern land use planning techniques make exten-
sive use of easements and real covenants as planning devices.30
22. Brown, 49 Wash. 2d at 214, 299 P.2d at 567; Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 10, 94 P.2d
at 753; Messett, 194 Wash. at 658, 79 P.2d at 342; Tamplin, 99 Wash. at 140, 168 P. at 985;
Hanson, 66 Wash. at 83, 118 P. at 928.
23. Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 11, 94 P.2d at 754; Hefner v. Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 123 U.S. 747 (1887).
24. Id.
25. Segregation of the servitude for tax purposes would involve the covenantees
and owners of easements separating their interests from the servient estate and
specifically entering those interests on the tax roles, similar to other property
interests.
26. Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 10, 94 P.2d at 753; Hanson, 66 Wash. at 83-84, 118 P. at
928.
27. Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 10, 94 P.2d at 753; see infra text accompanying notes
52-55.
28. "The collection of taxes would be seriously hindered, if a taxing authority be
required to examine each tract of land for possible easements .... Harmon, 1 Wash.
2d at 10, 94 P.2d at 753. At the time the doctrine was established, the courts were only
concerned with maximizing the efficiency of the tax collection system. Id.
29. This lack of consideration is evidenced by the court's reasoning in Harmon.
Id.
30. [Hlomeowners associations must, in the absence of statutes providing
enforcement tools, rely largely on that body of the law of real property which
governs covenants respecting the use of land. It is through the use of
recorded covenants and restrictions that "run with the land" that the
homeowners association seeks to make the controls and assessments vital to
its continued existence binding not only on those who acquired their homes
from the developer, but also on their successors in interest, who may not have
personally agreed to be bound by the community's rules.
6 ROHAN, HOME OWNER ASSOCIATION AND PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS-LAW AND
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If easements or real covenants are extinguished by a tax fore-
closure sale, entire housing developments and general building
plans could be rendered useless.3 1 Persons purchasing housing
tracts in planned residential developments could not be
assured that commercial business or industrial development
might not infiltrate the area simply because some party in the
development failed to pay their property taxes. 2 The practical
effect of the Hanson doctrine is to require any party living in a
development making use of easements or real covenants to
check on each neighbor to make sure property taxes are being
paid.33 The doctrine over-emphasizes administrative expedi-
ency (efficiency of tax collection) to the detriment of the par-
PRACTICE 8.02(1) (1986) (emphasis added); Accord, 1 ROHAN: RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM
LAW AND PRACTICE 10.02 (1986) (The purchasers of condominiums rely on the stability
of the condominium regime as an assurance that a particular type of life style is main-
tained. The enforcement of restrictions is necessary to foster the condominium devel-
opment). See Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 254, 91 P.2d
428, 433 (1939).
31. See supra note 30.
32. The regulation of commercial business through zoning ordinances is beyond
the scope of this article. The following quotation is an example of a recorded
restrictive covenant restricting a housing development to residential use only.
C-1 Land Use and Building Type. No lot in Lake Forest Division One
shall be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected,
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached
single family dwelling, not to exceed two stories in height and a private garage
for not more than three cars.
Lake Forest, Division No. 1 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 7,
(1973) Per plat recorded Vol. 18 of plats, pages 4 through 5, records of Thurston
County, Washington.
33. For example, each person residing in a residential development that used
covenants establishing a minimum value for all homes in the development, would have
to check on each neighbor to ensure that he kept all property taxes up to date. If taxes
were delinquent on a parcel, then the neighborhood would have to decide how those
taxes would be brought up to date. The question that arises is: who should pay? Since
the covenant benefits all members of the development, should the homeowner's
association pay the delinquent taxes or should individuals take turns making the
payments? Finally, how can the party or entity paying the taxes get reimbursed by the
property owner? The practical application of the court's analysis creates many such
problems.
If one lot is sold for delinquent taxes, according to the court's analysis, then the
covenant is extinguished and the new property owner is free to construct lower priced
homes. The result is the possible lowering of adjacent property values as well as the
destruction of the general scheme of the neighborhood. Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 12, 94
P.2d at 754 ("The owner of any easement or similar right has ample opportunity to
protect himself in its enjoyment. The burden properly rests upon him to do so."); but
see Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 67, 169 P.2d 781, 788 (1946) (citing Alamogordo
Improvement Co., 43 N.M. at 254, 91 P.2d at 433, 122 A.L.R. 1277; State ex rel. Koeln v.
West Cabanne Imp. Co., 278 Mo. 310, 213 S.W. 25 (1919); Schlafly v. Baumann, 341 Mo.
755, 764, 108 S.W.2d 363, 368 (1937)).
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ties' expectations.3 4
In addition, the method of protecting servitudes suggested
by the court in Hanson is impractical to apply. In Hanson, the
court suggested that anyone wishing to protect an interest in
an easement could have that interest segregated and taxed sep-
arately.3 5 The segregation of interests may have been appro-
priate under facts such as Hanson, where only two parties
were involved.3 6  However, when applied to a large housing
development, which may include hundreds or thousands of
people, the segregation of interests between parties is not prac-
tical.3 7 The Washington court's historical approach to priority
of tax deeds and tax foreclosure sales is not practical when
overall societal costs are taken into consideration.
On the other hand, the majority doctrine that was develop-
ing at the same time as Washington's priority approach pro-
duced a more favorable result.38  The majority position is based
on a tax assessment theory.39 The tax assessment theory
focuses on a different portion of the typical taxation statute
than Washington's priority approach. 40 The assessment theory
focuses on the actual assessed value of property on which the
34. See generally Comment, Extinguishment of Easements and Other Interests by
Tax Sale of Delinquent Property, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 262, 272 (1953)).
35. 66 Wash. at 83-84, 118 P. at 928; Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 10, 94 P.2d at 753; see
supra note 26.
36. Hanson, 66 Wash. 81, 118 P. 927.
37. See supra note 33.
38. Hendley v. Overstreet, 253 Ga. 136, 318 S.E.2d 54 (1984); Hayes, 110 Utah 54,
169 P.2d 781; Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389, 3 N.W.2d 734 (1942); Alamogordo
Improvement Co., 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McGurk, 119
N.J.L. 517, 197 A. 47 (1938); Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289,
66 P.2d 792 (1937); Schlafly, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S.W.2d 363; Ehren Realty v. Magna
Charta Building and Loan Ass'n., 120 N.J. 136, 184 A. 203 (1936); Crawford v. Senosky,
128 Or. 229, 274 P. 306 (1929); Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 A. 351
(1924); Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914); see also Comment,
Extinguishment of Easements and Other Interests by Tax Sale of Delinquent Property,
20 U. CHI. L. REV. 262 (1953).
39. The leading case defining the tax lien assessment theory is Tax Lien Co., 213
N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751; the tax lien assessment theory is also the approach accepted by
the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509 comment a (1944); see generally Kratovil, Tax
Titles: Extinguishment of Easements, Building Restrictions, and Covenants, 19 HOUS.
L. REV. 55 (1981); Comment, Extinguishment of Easements and Other Interests by Tax
Sale of Delinquent Property, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 262 (1953).
40. In Hayes, the court concentrates on the portion of the taxation statute setting
forth the criteria for establishing the value of the assessed property. "The assessors in
this State are required to appraise all taxable property 'at its full cash value.' " Hayes,
110 Utah at 63, 169 P.2d at 786. The case makes no mention of the priority status of
the tax lien. Washington's statute regarding valuation by the tax assessor is very
similar to the statute cited in Hayes: "All property shall be valued at one hundred
1987] Tax Foreclosure Sales
tax lien is based.4' The only interests transferred by a tax title
are those interests assessed in the value of the property.42 Any
interest not assessed would not be transferred by the tax deed
and would remain in effect.43
Applying this assessment approach to servitudes,44 the
courts reasoned that the burden of a servitude would tend to
lower the assessed value of the servient estate,45 resulting in a
lower tax liability.4 6 In effect, the servitude was carved out of
the land being taxed and would not be extinguished by a tax
foreclosure sale.4 7 On the other hand, the benefit of the servi-
tude would enhance the value of the dominant estate4' and
result in an increased tax liability.49 The interest in the servi-
tude would, accordingly, be passed on through a tax deed of
the dominant estate.5" The state would receive the appropriate
amount of tax since the lower assessed value of the servient
estate was offset by the increased assessed value of the domi-
nant estate; thus the servitude would remain intact.5
percent of its true and fair value in money and assessed on the same basis .... WASH.
REV. CODE § 84.40.030 (1987); cf. supra note 20 and accompanying text.
41. "[T]he assessment is the basis of the tax title and only that interest which was
properly assessed can be sold." Hayes, 110 Utah at 63, 169 P.2d at 786.
42. "If property rights which are not included in an assessment are sold or
extinguished by a tax sale, there would be a taking of property without due process of
law." Id.
43. Id.
44. In Hayes, the servitudes at issue were restrictive covenants establishing (1) a
minimum value for residences constructed in the area, (2) a twenty foot set-back from
property lines for all building construction, and (3) a rejection of any building for
business purposes. Id. at 56, 169 P.2d at 782. The tax assessment approach was
originally based on an easement analysis. Tax Lien Co., 213 N.Y. at 10, 106 N.E. at 752.
However, the general theory is just as appropriate when applied to real covenants,
either restrictive or affirmative. A real covenant produces a benefit and a burden that
would raise or lower assessed values in the same manner as an easement.
45. A servient estate is defined as an estate in respect of which a service is owing
as opposed to the dominant estate which is that estate to which the service is due.
Northwestern Improvement Co., 104 Mont. at 302, 66 P.2d at 795.
46. In Hayes, the court presumed that the assessor took such burdens into
consideration when establishing the value of a particular parcel of land. The court
presumed that property assessed without regard to interests such as easements or
covenants would be in complete disregard of the fair cash valuation required by
statute. Hayes, 110 Utah at 64, 169 P.2d at 786; see supra note 40.
47. Id. at 64, 169 P.2d at 786.
48. For the definition of dominant estate, see supra note 45.
49. Hayes, 110 Utah at 66, 169 P.2d at 787 (quoting Ehren Realty Co., 120 N.J. Eq.
136, 184 A. 203, 203-4 (1936)); see Note, Effect of Tax Sales on Appurtenant Easements
and Covenants Running With the Land, 29 NEB. L. REV. 458, 460 (1950).
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. Assuming that the assessed value of the dominant estate does increase in value
and results in an increased tax liability, a double taxation problem could arise. If a
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Although the majority approach protects the expectations
of the parties as to the use of servitudes for land use control, 2
the practical application of the majority rule is not wholly sat-
isfactory. The administrative burden on the taxing authority
would substantially increase if assessors were required to con-
sider all servitudes when valuing property.53 Determining the
existence of an easement or covenant can be quite time-
consuming. The tax assessor may have physical evidence of an
easement burdening the servient estate, but in most cases the
assessor would have to examine the records to determine the
existence of covenants or locate dominant estates.' If done
properly, the extra effort required to acquire and maintain the
appropriate information and records could be staggering.
Accordingly, there is doubt whether the tax assessing process
actually takes such interests into consideration.55
The tax assessment theory is based on rationale opposite
to that used in support of Washington's tax lien priority posi-
tion. Under the tax assessment theory, the courts do not con-
sider the rule burdensome to the tax collection system because
in order to comply with the tax valuation statutes, the servi-
tudes need to be identified by the taxing authority anyway.
Interests that affect the fair cash value of property must be
examined in order to obtain a valid appraisal and any other
approach would violate the property tax laws.56 The only bur-
den that the courts considered meaningful was the burden on
segregation analysis similar to that of Washington's is used (see supra note 26 and
accompanying text), forcing the dominant estate owner to pay taxes on the segregated
servitude interests would result in that owner paying double taxes on the beneficial
interest. The owner would have to pay once through the increased tax liability on the
dominant estate and a second time on the segregated interest. See Jackson v. Smith,
153 App. Div. 724, 726, 138 N.Y. Supp. 654, 656 (1st Dep't 1912), affd, 213 N.Y. 630, 107
N.E. 1079 (1914); Tax Titles-Equitable Servitudes-Does A Sale of Land For Taxes
Extinguish Equitable Servitudes?, 13 MIss. L.J. 653, 655.
52. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
53. Additional manpower would most likely be required to continually update
records and provide title searches, in order to keep assessors informed as to what
exactly is being assessed.
54. Easements providing ingress and egress to isolated tracts of land are often
physically visible and, therefore, provide physical notice of their existence to both the
servient and dominant estates. On the other hand, a real covenant establishing a
minimum construction value for buildings or a real covenant requiring that land
owners pay dues to homeowners' associations does not necessarily leave a physical
residue that might put a tax assessor on notice as to their existence. Consequently, the
assessor may have to search title records to determine if a covenant exists.
55. See Kratovil, Tax Titles: Extinguishment of Easements, Building Restrictions,
and Covenants 19 Hous. L. REV. 55, 57 (1981).
56. Hayes, 110 Utah at 63-65, 169 P.2d at 786.
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the landowners if they were forced to keep track of other par-
cels of land to make sure tax payments were kept up to date.57
On the other hand, Washington's priority theory considers
only the burden on the taxing authority.5  Whichever
approach is taken, the final outcome seems to result from
underlying policy considerations.59 The majority's result would
seem favorable to the chaos that could result if servitudes were
eliminated as land use planning tools.60
Many states are now taking a better approach to the prob-
lem through statutory reform. 1 Those states are enacting stat-
utes that allow easements and real covenants to continue after
a tax foreclosure sale regardless of whether the interests were
considered during the assessment process.6 2  The statutory
method has the advantage of eliminating most of the problems
associated with either the tax lien priority theory or the tax
assessment theory. 3 The property tax system is a legislative
creation and the legislature has the authority to dictate how
the system should work. However, the specific wording of the
statutes must be carefully drafted. Some poorly drafted stat-
utes, such as Washington's, refer only to easements while
others address only restrictive covenants. 4 To be completely
57. Id. at 67, 169 P.2d at 788 (citing Alamogordo Improvement Co. 43 N.M. 245, 91
P.2d 433; State ex rel. Koeln, 278 Mo. 310, 213 S.W. 25; Schlafly, 341 Mo. 755, 108 S.W.2d
363).
58. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
59. Comment, Extinguishment of Easements and Other Interests by Tax Sale of
Delinquent Property, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 262, 272 (1953).
60. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
61. By addressing the issue of tax sales and servitudes through a statutory route,
the problems encountered in both Washington's historical approach and the majority's
tax assessment approach can be eliminated. Statutes can be enacted that simply allow
servitudes of all kinds to continue in effect after the property with which they are
associated is sold at a tax foreclosure sale. Public policy can be furthered with no
consideration as to whether the servitudes were or were not assessed in the valuation
process. See Kratovil, Tax Titles: Extinguishment of Easements, Building Restrictions,
and Covenants, 19 HOUS. L. REV. at 66-72.
62. CAL. REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE § 3712 (Deering 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 197.573 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-7 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. § 120,
747(b) (Smith-Hurd 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 448.3 (West 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
79-2803 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 45 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.
§ 282.01(6) (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5723.12 (Page's 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 24349 (West 1966); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 84.64.460 (1987).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37 and 52-55.
64. IOWA CODE ANN. § 448.3 (West 1971) (restrictive covenants only); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 24349 (West 1966) (restrictive covenants only); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 84.64.460 (1987) (easements appurtenant only).
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effective, the statute should refer to all forms of servitudes.65
B. Post-1959 Statutory Approach
In 1959, the Washington legislature enacted a statute that
aligned Washington with the majority of states and stated that
a tax foreclosure sale did not extinguish easements on the
property being sold.66 The Washington statute states:
The general property tax assessed on any tract, lot or
parcel of real property includes all easements appurtenant
thereto, provided said easements are a matter of public rec-
ord in the auditor's office of the county in which said real
property is situated. Any foreclosure of delinquent taxes on
any tract, lot or parcel of real property subject to such ease-
ment or easements, and any tax deed issued pursuant
thereto shall be subject to such easement or easements, pro-
vided such easement or easements were established of rec-
ord prior to the year for which the tax was foreclosed. z
This statute is a codification of the previously discussed
tax assessment theory.68 The statute removes any question as
to whether an easement is included in the assessed value of the
servient estate and specifically makes tax deeds subject to
appurtenant easements of record.69 Unlike statutes of other
65. The Illinois statute is an example of a well-written statute taking into
consideration all forms of servitudes. The Illinois statute states:
No tax deed issued with respect to any real property sold pursuant to this
Act extinguishes or affects any easement, covenant running with the land or
right-of-way for water, sewer, electricity, gas, telephone or other public service
use which was created, on or over that real property before the time that real
property was sold pursuant to this Act and which is evidenced either by a
recorded instrument or by wires, poles, pipes, equipment or other public
service facilities. Where the real property described in a tax deed issued
pursuant to a sale under this Act is a dominant or a servient tenement with
respect to any private easement or easements, bona fide created expressly or
by operation of law for the benefit of a dominant tenement or tenements, that
tax deed shall operate with respect to the easement or easements in the same
manner and with like effect as a deed of conveyance made by the owner or
owners of the property described in the tax deed, just prior to the issuance of
such deed to the grantee in the tax deed.
This Section does not apply to the issuance of a tax deed resulting from
failure of the owner of any such easement, covenant running with the land or
right-of-way to pay taxes or special assessments assessed to that owner for
that easement, covenant running with the land or right-of-way.
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 120, $ 747(b) (Smith-Hurd 1970) (emphasis added).
66. See supra notes 38 and 62.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.64.460 (1987).
68. See supra note 39.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.64.460 (1987).
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states, the Washington statute does not go far enough. The
statute addresses only appurtenant easements and situations
where the servient estate is sold for taxes. The statute does
not address the effect of the sale of a dominant estate or the
effect a tax sale will have on other types of servitudes such as
real covenants.7 ° The statute could have addressed these
issues; but now judicial input is required to clarify these
deficiencies.
Prior to Palzer, there was only one case that had applied
section 84.64.460 of the Revised Code of Washington. In Clip-
pinger v. Birge,7' the court was called upon to fill in one of the
deficiencies in the statute by deciding whether the statute was
meant to apply to the tax sale of a dominant estate. The court
held that the legislature had intended to pass a tax deed sub-
ject to servient easements appurtenant together with dominant
easements appurtenant to the estate sold.72 The holding in this
opinion is consistent with the overriding public policies requir-
ing preservation of easements.7 3 Clippinger brought Washing-
ton one step closer to the. general protection of servitudes from
tax foreclosure sales. However, the courts still faced the prob-
lem of determining the fate of real covenants.7 4 Should Wash-
ington courts revert to the old tax lien priority analysis7 5 with
regard to real covenants, or should the court accept the more
practical protection policy embodied in the easement statute?
This was one issue before the court in Olympia v. Palzer7 6
70. See supra text accompanying note 67. On the other hand, easements in gross
established for public utilities are addressed separately from appurtenant easements
under the following Washington Statutes: WASH. REV. CODE § 84.20.010(1987)
(easements taxable as personalty); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.20.020 (1987) (servient estate
taxable as realty); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.20.030 (1987) (sale for taxes-realty to be sold
subject to easements); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.20.040 (1987) (realty not subject to tax on
easements or property thereon). These statutes are based on a similar analysis to
WASH. REV. CODE § 84.64.460 (1987). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509(1)
(1944) (in order to protect an easement in gross from extinguishment by a tax
foreclosure sale, the easement must be covered by a duly authorized separate tax).
71. 14 Wash. App. 976, 547 P.2d 871 (1976).
72. Id. at 985-86, 547 P.2d at 878; see Washington Legislation-1959-Real
Property-Assessment and Taxation of Easements, 34 WASH. L. REV. 332, 333 (1959).
73. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
74. See supra text accompanying note 70.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
76. 107 Wash. 2d at 229, 728 P.2d at 137.
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III. OLYMPIA V. PALZER: WASHINGTON'S
ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE
A. Facts and Holding of the Court
In 1969, the Evergreen Park Planned Unit Development
(PUD) was created in Olympia.7" The Evergreen Park PUD is
an integrated development, containing a combination of multi-
family residential and commercial units.78 The development
plan contained a number of easements and covenants designed
to control building development and to maintain the original
plan.79 Included in the covenants were building restrictions
that required four tracts of land within the development to be
set aside as natural greenbelt areas.8 0 The covenants required
these tracts, referred to as tracts A, B, C, and D, to be main-
tained in their natural condition to beautify the entire
development.8'
Evergreen Park, Inc., the developers of the PUD, retained
tracts A and D. 2 For a number of years prior to the final tax
sale, the developers failed to pay the property taxes on these
two tracts.8 3 As a result, Thurston County instituted a tax
foreclosure and scheduled the tracts for sale in 1981.4 The
county postponed the original sale for one year at the request
of some residents of the development in order to allow the res-
idents time to purchase the tracts and pay the taxes. 5 Negoti-
ations failed and one year later, in 1982, tracts A and D were
77. Plat of Evergreen Park recorded October 20, 1969, Thurston County Auditor's
Office Vol. 16 of Plats, 61-62. A PUD is defined as:
An area with a specified minimum contiguous acreage to be developed as
a single entity according to a plan, containing one or more residential clusters
or planned unit residential developments and one or more public, quasi-
public, commercial or industrial areas in such ranges of ratios of
nonresidential uses to residential uses as shall be specified in the zoning
ordinance.
BLACK'S LA-V DICTIONARY 1036 (5th ed. 1979).
78. Plat of Evergreen Park recorded October 20, 1969, Thurston County Auditor's
Office Vol. 16 of Plats, 61-62.
79. Covenants and Dedications Applicable to Evergreen Park, Filed October 20,
1969, Doc. No. 81148, Vol. 491, 638-641.
80. Id. (Article III provided that the covenants would run with the land and be
binding for a period of 25 years with automatic extensions for two additional ten year
periods).
81. Id.
82. Brief for Appellants at 8, Palzer, 42 Wash. App. 751, 713 P.2d 1125.
83. Brief for Appellants at 12.




Chris Palzer purchased the two tracts for the sum of
$4,401.19, which included all back property taxes and any addi-
tional fees established by the Thurston County Treasurer.
The tax sale agenda contained a notice of the restrictive cove-
nants imposed by the general building plan; therefore, there is
no question that Palzer knew of the restrictions before
purchasing the tracts.8 8 In February 1983, Palzer sold the
tracts to a developer for the sum of $135,000.89
The city of Olympia brought suits based on issues not rele-
vant to this article, seeking to rescind and declare void the
original tax sale by the county to Palzer.9 ° The trial court held
that the sale was valid. However, as a side issue, the court
ruled that the covenant restricting use of the tracts was valid
and was not extinguished by the tax sale.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling regard-
ing the restrictive use covenants.91 The court referred to the
issue as one of first impression in Washington and then sup-
ported the holding with two out-of-state cases which held that
restrictive covenants constitute easements that are not extin-
guished by a tax foreclosure sale.92 The court made no attempt
to explain Washington's historical tax lien priority analysis and
gave no reason why restrictive covenants should constitute
easements.93 The court simply adopted the easement analysis
86. Id at 12.
87. Brief for Respondent at 4, Palzer, 42 Wash. App. 751, 713 P.2d 1125.
88. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d at 227, 728 P.2d at 136.
89. Id.
90. The city of Olympia brought suit basing its original action on City Ordinance
3776. This ordinance was enacted in 1973 and incorporated the restrictive use
covenants that established green belt areas. In addition, the ordinance provided
further restrictions as to ownership of lots A, B, C, and D. Brief for Respondent at 7,
Palzer, 42 Wash. App. 751, 713 P.2d 1125. The court of appeals held that the ownership
restrictions in the ordinance were void and ruled on the issue of green belt restrictions
as simple covenants rather than based on the city ordinance. Palzer, 42 Wash. App. at
754 n. 4, 713 P.2d at 1127 n. 4. The Washington Supreme Court did not address any
issues regarding the validity of the ordinance. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d at 228, 728 P.2d at
136.
91. Palzer, 42 Wash. App. at 754, 713 P.2d at 1127.
92. Id. (citing Hendley v. Overstreet, 253 Ga. 136, 318 S.E.2d 54 (1984) (restrictive
covenants, requiring a tract of land to remain as a park for recreational purposes,
created an irrevocable easement and easements are not cut off by tax sales); Halpin v.
Poushter, 59 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1945) (a restrictive covenant, establishing a thirty foot set-
back from the street for construction of buildings was an easement and thus not
extinguished by a tax foreclosure sale)); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
93. Palzer, 42 Wash. App. at 754, 713 P.2d at 1127.
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and then concluded, stating:
This result is consistent with common sense and sound
policy. It is self-evident that restrictive covenants that run
with the land are intended to burden as well as to benefit all
tracts to which they apply. Invalidating them as to any tract
sold for a tax delinquency would result in adversely affect-
ing the value of all other tracts to which they are subject.94
This reasoning is consistent with the policy underlying the
majority approach, which is based on the tax assessment the-
ory discussed previously.95
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the court of appeals.96 However, unlike the court of appeals,
the supreme court attempted to address Washington's previous
approach to the issue. The court cited previous Washington
cases that allowed tax foreclosure sales to extinguish ease-
ments and restrictive covenants, but then distinguished them
as taking place prior to 1959 and the enactment of section
84.64.460 of the Revised Code of Washington.97
Next, the court analogized restrictive covenants to nega-
tive easements and held that "[i]n PUD's, restrictive covenants
are the same as negative easements because they curtail the
rights of the owner of the servient tenement in favor of the
owners of all of the dominant tenements."9 " Once the court
determined the restrictive covenants to be easements, section
84.64.460 of the Revised Code of Washington required that
Palzer's tax deed be subject to those restrictive covenants.
However, by using the easement analogy, the court severely
restricted the utility of this case to protect other forms of real
covenants.
On the other hand, the court did acknowledge some gen-
eral policy considerations. In dicta, the court stated that if
restrictive covenants were extinguished by a tax sale, the
94. Id.
95. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
96. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d at 232, 728 P.2d at 138.
97. Id. at 229-231, 728 P.2d at 137-38, (citing Brown, 49 Wash. 2d at 210, 299 P.2d at
564; Harmon, 1 Wash. 2d at 10, 94 P.2d at 749; Messett, 194 Wash. at 658, 79 P.2d at 337;
Hanson, 66 Wash. at 83, 118 P. at 927). The enactment of the statute in 1959 would
explain the requirement for a different outcome regarding easements. Nevertheless,
the existence of the statute does not completely explain why real covenants should
now be protected. The statute refers only to appurtenant easements of record and
does not mention real covenants. See supra text accompanying note 67.
98. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d at 230, 728 P.2d at 137.
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planned character of Evergreen Park and the expectations of
the homeowners would be defeated.99 Palzer is the first case
where the Washington Supreme Court recognized the general
policy considerations behind protecting servitudes. It indicates
a step toward accepting the majority viewpoint, which man-
dates continuing all servitudes after tax foreclosure sales.
B. The Ramifications of Palzer
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Palzer is a
much needed step toward accepting and supporting the reality
of modern land use planning.100 The court properly rejected
its historical analysis established in the pre-1959 cases10 ' as
destructive of modern planned developments and the general
expectations of property owners.
Palzer is the first case since 1938 to address the effect of a
tax foreclosure sale on covenants. 0 2 Since the pre- 1959 cases
were all hindered by the archaic tax lien priority theory,10 3
Palzer presented an excellent opportunity for the Washington
Supreme Court to align itself with the modern approach of
preserving all forms of servitudes.
The holding in Palzer, however, is based solely on an anal-
ysis that determines that restrictive covenants are equivalent
to negative easements and, therefore, not extinguished by rea-
son of statutory authority.0 4 The court's research is aimed at
showing the close similarities between restrictive covenants
and easements.0 5 By analogizing negative easements and
restrictive covenants, the court can produce a desired outcome
while taking advantage of a shortcut afforded to them by stat-
ute.106 Once a servitude can be defined as an easement, the
problem becomes moot because statutory authority requires
easements to continue after tax foreclosure sales. 07
The problem with the easement analogy is that it produces
a holding that is unnecessarily narrow and restrictive. The
99. Id. at 231, 728 P.2d at 138. For an example of homeowner's expectations as a
policy consideration, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
100. 107 Wash. 2d 225, 728 P.2d 135.
101. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
104. 107 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 728 P.2d at 137.
105. Id
106. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 62, 63.
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Palzer holding will protect covenants from tax sales only as
long as those covenants can be analogized to easements.08
This is not to say that the court's analysis was incorrect. There
is substantial authority to analogize restrictive covenants to
easements and the final outcome in Palzer is more than sup-
ported by public policy.109 Nevertheless, by relying completely
on the easement rationale, the fate of other forms of servitudes
remains uncertain.
The Palzer court left the following question unanswered:
what will happen when a real covenant that cannot be slipped
in under an easement analysis is threatened with destruction
from a tax foreclosure sale? For example, would an affirma-
tive covenant such as a requirement to pay homeowners' asso-
ciation dues, or to maintain property in a certain state of
repair, be extinguished by a tax foreclosure sale?" 0 When a
covenant imposes an affirmative duty upon the covenantor, it
is not possible to construe the covenant as an easement."'
108. 107 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 728 P.2d at 137; see infra text accompanying notes 111-
12.
109. See supra note 99; see also Alamogordo Improvement Co., 43 N.M. at 248, 91
P.2d at 430-31, 122 A.L.R. 1277; Northwestern Improvement Co., 104 Mont. at 301, 66
P.2d at 794, 110 A.L.R. 605; Annotation, Easements or Servitude or Restrictive
Covenant as Affected by Sale for Taxes, 168 A.L.R. 529, 536 (1947).
110. Today, typical provisions of residential development schemes call for
common areas in the subdivision to be operated by an association of
homeowners. The declaration of covenants and restrictions often calls for
mandatory membership in the association for all unit owners and for the
payment by each lot owner of periodic charges for maintenance within the
development and provides for the imposition of special assessments for repairs
or improvements. Other covenants may call for submission of plans for new
buildings or renovations to an architectural control committee set up by the
association, and for the proper maintenance of his property by the individual
lot owner.
6 ROHAN, HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS - LAW
AND PRACTICE 8.03(2)(c) (1986). See supra note 1.
111. The creation of an easement appurtenant operates to transfer some of
the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities from the owner of the servient
land to the owner of the dominant land. Therefore, the easement is itself an
interest in the land of the servient owner, and its creation requires no privity
of estate relationship between the parties. . . . On the contrary, a real
covenant transfers no property interest in the burdened land to the
covenantee, but creates in him a contractual right in personam against the
burdened landowner. Since in the case of easements the rights of the
dominant landowner are rights in rem, the duties of the servient landowner
are purely negative in character. . . . Whenever a covenant imposes purely
negative duties upon this convenantor, it is impossible for the court to
construe the covenant as an easement so as to escape the necessity for privity
of the estate between the parties.
2 AMERICAN LAW ON PROPERTY 9.12 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (footnotes omitted).
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Therefore, based strictly on the Palzer analysis, it is still possi-
ble for a court to extinguish affirmative covenants under the
old tax lien priority theory.112
However, affirmative covenants are supported by the same
general public policy arguments that require easements to be
protected. To allow them to be extinguished by a tax foreclo-
sure sale does as much damage to land use planning schemes
and property owner's expectations as the destruction of ease-
ments.1 3 Often affirmative covenants are made part of ease-
ment grants in order to facilitate the easement." 4  If the
easement is to be preserved against destruction by a tax sale,
then it stands to reason that a covenant that makes up a part
of that easement should also be preserved."' The narrow
holding of Palzer is not capable of supporting such a result.
Even though the Palzer analysis is narrow, the court's
acknowledgement of the overriding public policy supporting
the general protection of all forms of servitudes does provide a
positive starting point for future litigation. The Palzer court's
acceptance of the policy is apparent in its statement that, "[i]f
these restrictive covenants were extinguished by the tax fore-
closure sale, the planned character of Evergreen Park, the
expectations of homeowners and statutory authority would be
defeated.""' 6 The next step will be to push the policy consider-
ations beyond dicta. Real covenants, regardless of their nature
as either restrictive or affirmative, are equally necessary as
land use planning tools and require equal protection from
extinguishment under tax foreclosure sales.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Olympia v. Palzer is a step in the right
direction for the Washington courts regarding tax sales and
their effect on servitudes. However, the court's reasoning fails
to go far enough.
112. See Lake Arrowhead Club v. Looney, 50 Wash. App. 238, - P.2d - (1988).
Looney, decided just prior to publication of this Note, is an example of the
inappropriate consequences resulting from the courts' continued reliance on the old
tax lien priority theory. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
114. Kratovil, Tax Titles: Extinguishment of Easements, Building Restrictions
and Covenants, 19 Hous. L. REV. 55, 64 (1981); Kratovil, Easement Draftmanship and
Conveyancing, 38 CAL. L. REV. 426, 449 (1950).
115. See supra note 114.
116. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d at 231, 728 P.2d at 138.
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In the past, Washington courts have subscribed to an out-
dated theory, which established tax deeds as superior to all
other forms of liens or encumbrances including easements and
servitudes of any kind. This approach produced a severe hard-
ship on land use plans that utilized servitudes to control land
development and create better living environments. The situa-
tion was partially remedied in 1959 with the passage of statu-
tory authority recognizing the importance of easements, but
the statute failed to take into consideration other forms of ser-
vitudes. Thus, the burden still remains on the courts to pro-
vide the necessary analysis to protect servitudes other than
easements.
The Palzer holding provides some of that protection. Based
on an easement analogy, the court has now answered the ques-
tion as to restrictive covenants. Nevertheless, the fate of
affirmative covenants is still questionable. If future litigation
takes a more generalized approach and focuses on the public
policy approach instead of a narrow easement analysis, all
forms of covenants including affirmative covenants could enjoy
the protection that is due these necessary and practical land
use planning devices.
Daniel W. Galvin
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